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Abstract 
The paper attempts to provide an overview of the fiscal decentralization process in emerging 
market economies in Eastern Europe in the last 20 years. Using methodology developed by 
Vo (2009), the paper assesses the degree of fiscal decentralization in the region. 
Conceptually, the measurement of fiscal decentralization focuses on fiscal autonomy and the 
fiscal importance of subnational governments. The empirical analysis reveals that according 
to our definition of fiscal decentralization the highest level of (average) fiscal decentralization 
(centralization) is found in Russia (Armenia) among non-EU members and in Estonia (Slovak 
Republic) among EU members of the Eastern European. In addition, the empirical results 
show that, in general, the degree of fiscal decentralization is higher in developed OECD 
countries than in most Eastern European countries (EECs). However, in contrast to our 
expectations, there has been an alarming downward trend of FDI in most of the region over 
the last two decades. Moreover, the paper also examines the effects of fiscal decentralization 
on growth and public sector size in EECs. The analysis provides some evidence that increases 
in public sector decentralization are associated with higher income levels. However, the 
growth-enhancing effects of fiscal decentralization are expected to be much greater when 
supported by a sound institutional environment. Therefore, EECs, in particular non-EU 
member states, should improve their administrative and technical capability in order to 
establish sound and effective fiscal decentralization. Finally, our results suggest that fiscal 
decentralization in EECs generally leads to an increase in the size of government, albeit there 
are some significant differences between EU and non-EU member states.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, fiscal decentralization has become a central concern in countries 
around the world, especially in emerging market economies in Eastern Europe. These 
economies have been particularly interesting with regard to this topic because when 
communism collapsed in 1989 these countries embarked on a transition from highly 
centralized, planned systems to more decentralized, market-dominated economies. Indeed, the 
past shift towards democratic forms of governance has been closely associated with the 
demand for decentralized government. At the same time, increased fiscal decentralization
1
 is, 
in itself, seen as an important way of boosting democratic participation in the decision-
making process, thereby enhancing the accountability and transparency of government 
actions. In yet other countries, the trend towards greater autonomy for subnational levels of 
government is driven by the need for national coherence in the face of ethnic or regional 
centrifugal forces or conflicts.  
 
In many Eastern European countries (EECs)
2
, the political and economic failure of the 
autocratic, highly centralized socialist regimes may have provided an impetus for the 
subsequent decentralization initiatives. Most of these economies have faced many challenges 
meeting the requirements to ensure the successful carrying out of fiscal decentralization 
reforms. Persistent macroeconomic instability, the legacy of more than 40 years of central 
planning, and the presence of weak legal systems have represented important obstacles to the 
design of effective decentralized systems. The result has been the implementation of fiscal 
decentralization processes often criticized for their lack of transparency and of a clear division 
of powers between the different levels of government (Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer, 2009).  
 
                                                           
1
 Decentralization is typically viewed as having three overlapping components (World Bank, 2000; UNDP, 
2008): political, fiscal and administrative. Political decentralization involves the transfer of political authority 
from central to locally elected state bodies. Fiscal decentralization refers to providing local government with the 
capacity and authority to define and collect taxes and revenues, manage public resources and make expenditures 
for the provision of public services. Finally, administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, 
responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of governance (three 
major forms of administrative decentralization exist: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution). 
2
 The EECs represent Central Europe, South-east Europe, the Baltic states, Transcaucasia and some other former 
Soviet states. In our study the EECs include Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and Ukraine.    
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Using methodology developed by Vo (2009), the paper assesses the degree of fiscal 
decentralization in Eastern Europe over the last two decades. Discussions on fiscal 
decentralization have recently centred on four main areas: the assignment of expenditure 
responsibility; revenue assignment (taxing powers); intergovernmental fiscal transfers; and 
subnational borrowing. Conceptually, fiscal decentralization can be divided into two broad 
categories: (i) the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments; and (ii) the fiscal importance 
of subnational governments. In this regard, the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
mainly deals with the assignment of taxing powers, including supplementary tools such as 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, subnational borrowing and the assignment of responsibility 
for the public provision of goods and services, whereas fiscal importance is directly connected 
with the level of expenditure responsibility of subnational governments relative to the level of 
all government expenditures.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief literature review of 
arguments commonly advanced in favour of fiscal decentralization and some possible 
approaches to measure it. Section 3 shows trends and developments of fiscal decentralization 
in selected EECs in the last two decades. Section 4 presents a brief discussion and the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and public sector size in the Eastern Europe 
region. The last section concludes.  
 
 
2. The Rationale for Fiscal Decentralization and Its Measurement  
The theoretical literature about fiscal decentralization originally centred around the works of 
Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), and Oates (1972), where it is claimed that decentralization 
helps promote allocative efficiency, efficiency of the delivery of public services and greater 
transparency. It is often argued that fiscal decentralization increases economic efficiency 
because local governments are better positioned than the national government to deliver 
public services as a result of their proximity and informational advantage (Klugman, 1994). 
This proximity is particularly important in emerging market economies where, in the absence 
of market opportunities, vulnerable populations rely heavily on state action for their survival 
(Besley and Burgess, 2002). Moreover, decentralized expenditures may lead to greater 
“consumer efficiency” (Thießen, 2003). As demands differ in each territory, resources can be 
saved by diversifying governments’ outputs in accordance with local demands (Martínez-
Vázquez and McNab, 2003). Population mobility and competition among local governments 
4 
 
for the delivery of public services ensure the matching of preferences between local 
communities and local governments (Tiebout, 1956). Finally, fiscal decentralization is likely 
to instigate horizontal and vertical competition (Tiebout 1956) at subnational levels, forcing 
governments to concentrate on the efficient production of public goods and services, and 
limiting the capacity of bureaucrats to act as revenue maximizers (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980; Breton, 1983; Thießen, 2003). Last but not least, fiscal decentralization is also seen as a 
way of boosting democratic participation in the decision-making process (Dabla-Norris, 
2006), allowing for greater transparency and accountability (Azfar et al., 1999; Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002). 
 
In order to measure fiscal decentralization, either revenue or expenditure from subnational 
governments has been used in empirical studies. For example, in his pioneering study, Oates 
(1972) uses the national government share in total public revenue as the degree of fiscal 
centralization. More recently, Woller and Phillips (1998) measure fiscal decentralization in 
one of four ways: (i) the ratio of local government revenues to total government revenues; (ii) 
the ratio of local government revenues less grants-in-aid to total government revenues; (iii) 
the ratio of local government expenditures to total government expenditures; and (iv) the ratio 
of local government expenditures to total government expenditures less defence and social 
security expenditures.
3
 Since most studies are based on the IMF (GFS) dataset which exhibits 
some deficiencies
4
, Thornton (2007) uses a measure that supposedly captures the ‘true’ 
amount of subnational autonomy. This measure, originally provided by the OECD (1999) 
(and updated by Blöchliger and King, 2006), is obtained by differentiating subnational tax 
revenue according to the level of autonomy subnational governments have over the associated 
rates and bases, and then calculating the ratios with regard to total government tax receipts.
5
 
Similarly, Thießen (2000, 2003) exposes four decentralization variables. Two of these are the 
most frequently used measures in the current literature (see, for instance, Rodríguez-Pose and 
Krøijer, 2009; Baskaran, 2010): subnational shares of revenue and expenditure. Each of these 
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 Similar measures have been employed by Zhang and Zou (1998), Lin and Liu (2000), Thieben (2003), Darby et 
al. (2005), Neyapti (2010) and Buser (2011). 
4
 A well-recognized drawback of the IMF dataset is that it provides an inaccurate picture of the ‘true’ level of 
decentralization. As Rodden (2004) notes, it takes the expenditures undertaken and revenue obtained by 
subnational governments at face value. Consequently, the data might indicate a high level of 
revenue/expenditure decentralization even though the autonomy of subnational governments over fiscal matters 
might actually be negligible (Baskaran and Feld, 2009).  
5
 Even though the data used by Thornton (2007) provide a better approximation of the true extent of 
decentralization than the IMF measures and hence lend credibility to his results, they exhibit an important 
drawback as they are only available as a cross-section dataset (Baskaran and Feld, 2009). 
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indicators is a ratio of subnational budgetary activity net of grants to total government 
activity. An average of the revenue and expenditure share could be the third decentralization 
variable. This measure can simultaneously account for both revenue and expenditure 
decentralization and identify the relative strengths of the two impacts. The fourth measure of 
decentralization accounts for the autonomy of subnational governments from the federal level. 
This indicator is the percentage of subnational revenues independently collected rather than 
financed through inter-governmental transfers.  
 
It is widely accepted that previous works mainly measured fiscal decentralization on a 
superficial basis (Vo, 2009). In empirical studies, there has been an insufficient emphasis on 
the important distinction between subnational ‘revenue’ and own-sourced revenue over which 
a subnational jurisdiction has policy autonomy. Indeed, most of the above-mentioned 
measures are inadequate because the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments has not 
been properly taken into consideration. As a result, Vo (2009) developed a fundamental fiscal 
decentralization index (FDI) that allows an international comparison of various nations’ 
degree of fiscal decentralization. The FDI consists of two main elements, i.e. the fiscal 
autonomy and the fiscal importance of subnational governments. The fiscal autonomy of 
subnational governments (FA) is represented by the ratio of subnational governments’ own-
sourced revenue to subnational governments’ expenditure: 
  
 =  	
 	
 ,        (1) 
 
where OSRi represents the own-source revenue (total subnational revenue less grants received 
from the central government) of subnational government i, Ei represents the expenditure made 
by subnational government i, and n is the number of subnational governments. Further, the 
fiscal importance of subnational governments (FI) can be defined as follows: 
 
 =  	
 ,                     (2) 
 
where TE represents total public sector expenditures by all levels of government within the 
country. This includes expenditures by the national government and all subnational 
governments, excluding fiscal transfers from one government to another (such as national 
government fiscal transfers to subnational governments). 
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In both equations (1) and (2) presented above, the denominator is based on public expenditure 
– subnational governments’ public expenditure in the case of equation (1) and total public 
expenditure in equation (2). As such, public expenditure may be viewed as the reference point 
against which both FA and FI are assessed. Fiscal autonomy is represented by subnational 
governments’ own-sourced revenue to subnational governments’ expenditures, while fiscal 
importance is subnational governments’ expenditure to total public expenditure. The fiscal 
decentralization index (FDI) is based on the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” 
approach and is the geometric average of the measures of the two elements (Vo, 2009)
 6
: 
 
 =  ∗  =  	
 	
 ∗
 	

         (3) 
 
In principle, the FDI would be greater than 100 when, and only when, there is negative total 
expenditure by the national government – a completely implausible situation. As components 
FA and FI are both to be positive fractions, we may conclude that the FDI will also be 
positive and the lower the value of the index, the less fiscally decentralized is the country. 
Indeed, the situation of a country where 50<FDI<100 can be described as ‘relative fiscal 
decentralization’, and ‘relative fiscal centralization’ where 0<FDI<50. Perfect fiscal 
centralization (FDI=0) whereby subnational expenditure is fully funded by fiscal transfers 
from the national government (when OSR is zero), and perfect fiscal decentralization 
(FDI=100) whereby total public expenditure is fully funded by subnational governments 
(when OSR=TE) are two extreme cases that are only theoretically possible. 
 
In the next section, the FDI concept is applied and calculated for selected EECs (Armenia, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech R., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak R., Slovenia and Ukraine) and compared 
with some developed OECD countries. Due to a lack of data, some countries from the region 
are not included (such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan etc). The data set 
comes from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS). 
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 In order to account for institutional constraints on fiscal events, an adjustment factor (AF) for fiscal autonomy 
would be required (see Vo, 2009). However, due to the lack of data on conditional and unconditional fiscal 
transfers for the considered countries as well as due to the fact that conditional transfers in EECs are much 
smaller compared to OECD countries (see Adugna and Ford, 2010) we will neglect it in the analysis. Therefore, 
we should have in mind that ‘true’ level of decentralization in the region is probably lower. 
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3. Trends and Developments of Fiscal Decentralization in Selected EECs 
Fiscal decentralization tends to be a relatively recent phenomenon in emerging market 
economies such as EECs. In these countries, the two main reasons for the emergence of 
decentralization are either failures in economic planning by central governments and/or the 
changing international economic and political conditions (Smoke 2001). In these 
circumstances, decentralization has been promoted as a means to achieve economic gains 
rather than the more traditional objective of decentralization to deliver a better setting for 
ethnic, religious, cultural or historical differences within nation-states (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2005). However, in order to ensure sound and efficient fiscal decentralization, three main 
principles should be followed, i.e. clarity of roles and transparency, an explicit and well-
defined measure of autonomy and developed institutional capacity (Dabla-Norris, 2006). As 
EECs have considered these principles differently, the process of fiscal decentralization in 
emerging market economies in Europe has resulted in a large variety of devolved systems, 
with varying degrees of fiscal, administrative and political powers being awarded to 
subnational governments.  
 
The combination of efforts aimed at consolidating macroeconomic stabilization during the 
early years of the transition, together with the fundamental structural changes in the economy, 
is reflected in the fiscal decentralization processes in many EECs. In general, these processes 
have been rapid, haphazard and largely nontransparent, with the emerging system of 
intergovernmental relations holding important implications for budgetary developments 
(Dabla-Norris, 2006). Therefore, some more developed EECs have also promoted institutional 
settings and processes that allow effective fiscal decentralization. The uneven nature of the 
degree of decentralization among EECs also reflects their demographic, ethnic, historical and 
political differences. For instance, countries with larger populations or geographic areas (such 
as Russia, Poland and Ukraine) require a greater decentralization of public service provision 
to subnational governments compared to smaller countries like Macedonia, Moldova and the 
Baltics (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005; Panizza, 1999; Dabla-
Norris, 2006). Similarly, ethnically diverse countries such as Russia also have a fairly high 
need for fiscal decentralization compared to other, smaller and ethnically more homogeneous 
transition economies (such as Slovenia). At the same time, political factors such as accession 
to the EU can be seen as providing an impetus for reform in countries like the Czech 
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Republic, Poland and Hungary. In countries such as Croatia and Macedonia ethnic conflict 
may have played a significant role in shaping the nature of fiscal decentralization that has 
evolved. Differences in institutional, economic and political development can also be 
expected to influence the extent of decentralization across these countries (Dabla-Norris, 
2006).  
 
Figure 1: Average FDI in selected EECs and OECD countries 
 
Note:  The data set for EECs is based on available data averages for the 1993–2010 
period. The data for developed OECD countries are derived from Vo (2009).  
 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
 
In general, EU members of the EECs have progressively developed towards increased local 
decision-making authority over expenditures, in combination with a fiscal system that is 
generally transparent and stable. But again, the extent of fiscal decentralization varies among 
the economies. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have the highest FDI (averaging 56.6, 55.9 and 
51.2, respectively, in the period 1993–2010) while the lowest average levels are exhibited in 
Slovak Republic and Bulgaria (averaging 27.9 and 33.9, respectively, in the period under 
consideration) (see Fig. 1 and Tab. 1).
7
 While there is a consensus that EU members of EECs 
                                                           
7
 It is obvious that high-income OECD countries generally exhibit higher levels of fiscal decentralization than 
EECs (see Fig. 1). Further, the average FDI of EECs is around 42 and is well below the average level attained by 
developed OECD countries (around 50; this difference is statistically significant as it is confirmed with an 
independent t-test (p=0.02)). Indeed, the degree of fiscal decentralization is expected to be higher in developed 
countries (i.e. OECD) than in emerging market economies (i.e. EECs).        
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have made considerable progress in carrying out decentralization and established institutional 
settings that are supportive of decentralization, the persisting weaknesses of the existing 
systems are preventing full exploitation of the benefits of decentralization. In some countries, 
grants made by central government which constitute a large part of municipal revenues 
continue to be subject to negotiations every year. Although the fiscal autonomy of many new 
EU member state local governments is quite broad, the main tax revenue for local budgets 
comes from personal income tax for which the central government sets both the rate and the 
base (UNDP, 2008).  
 
Figure 2: Average FA, FI and FDI in selected EECs (1993–2010) 
 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
 
On the other hand, among non-EU members of the EECs the local environment for 
decentralization is typically unfavourable. Consequently, the fiscal decentralization process 
has made relatively little progress.
8
 The highest degree of fiscal decentralization is found in 
Russia (whose FDI averages out at 61.5), particularly due to its size and diversity. 
Surprisingly, Belarus (60.6.) is also among the forerunners in fiscal decentralization (see Fig. 
1 and Tab. 1). However, the executive power structure there is organized in a top-down 
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 However, the independent t-test reveals that the difference between both sub-regions is not statistically 
significant (p=0.842). 
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manner and reports directly to the president, which undermines the accountability of the 
executive branch to locally elected people’s representatives. In contrast, Armenia (17.7.) and 
Macedonia (26.5), both small unitary states, are the most fiscally centralized countries in the 
subregion.
9
 In the group of non-EU members, in particular in Transcaucasia and other former 
Soviet states, it has been noticed that the system mainly reflects the old Soviet modes of doing 
business (the system of oblasts and rayons) and no significant real steps for reform are being 
taken. Subnational governments remain de-concentrated central units of central government 
and major reforms in the functioning of the state are needed in order to strengthen 
accountability at the national and local level and to develop civil society (UNDP, 2008). 
 
The calculation of the fiscal autonomy (FA) and fiscal importance (FI) of subnational 
governments of the Eastern European region shows that Hungary and Armenia have the 
lowest average level of FA and FI in the 1993–2010 period, respectively (see Tab. 1 and Fig. 
2). In many EECs, the financing of subnational governments is mainly achieved through tax 
sharing and transfers from other levels of government. Only certain advanced reformers have 
devolved some revenue autonomy to subnational governments, although they still rely on the 
central government for the main part of their revenues (Dabla-Norris 2006). For example, in 
the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the share of ‘own’ revenue 
(over which they have policy control and collect themselves) ranges from 33 to 40 percent.
10
 
However, the low FA in Hungary, for instance, implies that subnational governments have 
low taxing power to cover costs occurred in the provision of public goods and services. On 
the other hand, as a consequence of the need to redesign the public sector revenue system 
during the transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy, central governments have 
also tried to reduce money transfers while increasing local revenue sources, such as taxes, in 
an effort to create more self-sufficient subnational governments. In this respect, Croatia seems 
to have the highest fiscal autonomy as, in contrast to many other EECs, local governments in 
Croatia have been provided with ‘real’ fiscal resources and have the potential to realize real 
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 When comparing the results with the results of Vo (2009), Armenia has the same (average) level of fiscal 
decentralization as Indonesia (in 1999) and Russia as Brazil (in 1998) or Sweden (in 2005). 
10
 Nevertheless, some of the advanced reformers in EECs (including Hungary and Poland) have the lowest tax 
sharing rates, whereas in Russia and Ukraine revenues from taxes shared on a derivation basis continue to 
account for well over 60 percent of regional revenue receipts (Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
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responsibilities. However, the degree of tax efficiency depends largely on the real autonomy 
of subnational governments in determining their own tax base.
11
 
 
Table 1: Fiscal decentralization index (FDI) in selected EECs in the 1993–2010 period 
 
Fiscal 
Autonomy 
(FA) 
 
Fiscal 
Importance 
(FI) 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Index 
(FDI) 
 
 
FDI* 
1993–2000 
 
 
FDI* 
2001–2010 
Armenia 46.4 6.9 17.7 n.a. 17.7 
Belarus 75.4 48.9 60.6 n.a. 60.6 
Bulgaria 52.1 25.4 33.9 38.7 30.1 
Croatia 86.0 15.2 36.0 40.5 32.8 
Czech R. 62.0 27.1 40.8 40.9 40.8 
Estonia 72.4 49.4 56.6 58.7 46.5 
Hungary 33.4 39.1 37.6 37.6 35.3 
Latvia 68.5 38.8 51.2 57.2 48.2 
Lithuania 70.8 77.9 55.9 55.9 n.a. 
Macedonia 52.3 14.1 26.5 n.a. 26.5 
Moldova 60.6 38.0 47.6 49.1 46.7 
Poland 61.8 41.1 49.7 49.7 n.a. 
Romania 62.8 19.3 37.8 35.8 54.3 
Russia 73.3 52.6 61.5 87.9 62.9 
Serbia 64.2 18.9 34.8 n.a. 34.8 
Slovak R. 64.9 12.6 27.9 28.6 26.3 
Slovenia 63.2 26.7 40.4 40.0 40.7 
Ukraine 59.9 41.8 49.8 57.0 48.4 
    
Min 43.1 6.9 17.7 28.6 17.7 
Max 86.0 77.9 61.5 87.9 62.9 
Average 63.3 32.6 42.5 48.4 40.8 
Notes: *Only limited data is available for the both sub-periods under consideration.   
FA, FI and FDI calculations are based on equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively, where:  
OSR = Local Govt. Revenue - Grants for Local Govt.;  
E = Local Govt. Total Outlays;  
TE = Budg. Cen. Govt. Total Outlays + Local Govt. Total Outlays - Grants for Local Govt.; 
            n.a. – not available.  
 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
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 Generally, a low level of revenue autonomy, particularly among the non-EU members of the Eastern European 
region, reflects a weak subnational administrative capacity, political constraints, and central limits on 
subnational tax rates (Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer, 2009). 
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As also seen in Tab. 1 and Fig. 2, FI ranges from as high as 77.9 in Lithuania and 52.6 in 
Russia to 6.9 in Armenia. Indeed, despite the systematic approach the Armenian government 
is taking to local government (finance) reform, a substantive criticism of Armenia’s 
decentralization reform is that the degree of decentralization Armenia is pursuing is quite 
limited, with a relatively narrow scope of responsibilities and revenue sources assigned to the 
local level (UNDP, 2005). However, the level of fiscal decentralization does not always 
match expectations, with Lithuania – a small and homogeneous country – having, at least on 
paper, the highest level of fiscal (expenditure) decentralization. In contrast, the ethnic 
diversity of the Slovak Republic or Macedonia is not reflected in high fiscal 
decentralization.
12
   
 
Figure 3: FDI developments in selected EECs in the 1993–2010 period 
 
 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
 
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the evolution of the FDI for selected EECs across time. Apparently, 
many countries exhibit a considerable amount of within variation for our decentralization 
measure (FDI). Since the beginning of the 2000s, Croatia, Latvia, Moldova and Ukraine 
exhibit an increasing trend of fiscal centralization. By contrast, Slovenia and the Czech 
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 Indeed, expenditure autonomy at the subnational level has been limited in many EECs. In a number of 
countries, such as Moldova, Romania and Russia, the distribution of spending responsibilities remains unclear 
(Dabla-Norris, 2006). In Bulgaria, 90 percent of actual local expenditure in 1999 was not under the control of 
local authorities (McCullough et al., 2000). This is in contrast to the situation in Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
Latvia and the Czech Republic where the law grants subnational governments greater flexibility in service 
delivery (Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
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Republic show relatively small time variations with some increasing trends of fiscal 
decentralization in the same period. Nevertheless, the fiscal decentralization index has 
declined in a great majority of the EECs even when comparing the averages of two sub-
periods (the only exceptions are Romania and Slovenia) (see Tab. 1). Accordingly, a 
concerning trend of fiscal centralization in the region is visible.
13
 
 
 
4.  The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Economic Growth and the Size of the Public 
Sector in EECs 
 
4.1. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 
No formal theory directly links decentralization and growth. Arguments in favour of fiscal 
decentralization, originally centred around the works of Tiebout (1956), Musgrave (1959), 
and Oates (1972), claim it promotes higher efficiency, a better public service, greater 
transparency and, eventually, economic growth. The best known mechanism through which 
fiscal decentralization may lead to greater overall economic efficiency is the so-called ‘fiscal 
decentralization’ theorem: the fact that, due to informational advantages and a better insight 
into the preferences of citizens, subnational governments are more capable than national 
governments to tailor the provision of public goods and services to the needs of local citizens 
(Tiebout, 1956; Klugman, 1994). While most ‘theories’ on fiscal decentralization indeed 
argue for a positive association between both variables, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. 
Although fiscal decentralization is often associated with the already mentioned greater 
transparency and better capacity of governments to adapt policies to subnational needs, it can 
be difficult to connect these factors to increased economic performance. Especially in 
countries lacking the appropriate institutions, such as non-EU members of the Eastern 
European region, legal systems, human capital and economic growth rates are unlikely to rise 
as a direct result of fiscal decentralization. Indeed, the opposite is more likely to happen, with 
decentralization having an inverse effect on economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer, 
2009).
14
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 Nevertheless, the paired samples t-test shows that significance value (p) is approaching significance, but it is 
not significant (p=0.122). Therefore, we cannot confirm that there is a statistically significant difference between 
FDI levels when comparing both sub-periods in the whole Eastern European region. 
14
 This scepticism is fuelled by problems often associated with fiscal decentralization, such as increasing fiscal 
deficits, corruption, inadequate governmental decisions, the stronger influence of interest groups, and greater 
interregional inequalities, which may result in lower economic performance (Prud’Homme, 1995). 
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Most empirical studies highlight a positive correlation between both variables, in particular 
for developed economies, the majority of which are ‘mature’ democracies. For instance, 
Piriou-Sall (1998), Yilmaz (1999), Thießen (2000, 2003), Eller (2004), Ebel and Yilmaz 
(2002), Iimi (2005), Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), Baskaran and Feld (2009) and 
Buser (2011) show a positive relationship. Conversely, some studies find negative 
correlations, especially in the case of developing and emerging market economies (see 
Davoodi and Zou, 1998). Studies which focus mainly on European emerging market 
economies find a positive relationship (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002), a negative relationship 
(Rodden, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer, 2009) and also no significant relationship (Feld 
and Dede, 2004; Bodman and Ford, 2006). 
 
Figure 4: Correlation between FDI and GDP growth in selected EECs 
 
Note: The data are based on available data averages for the 2001–2010 period. 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
 
In Fig. 4, we plot the average level of FDI against average economic growth for the sample 
period (2001–2010) in each considered EEC. The figure indicates there is substantial 
between-variation in both the level of economic growth and the FDI among selected EECs. 
The bivariate plot indicates a positive, but weak relationship between the variables. Indeed, 
the correlation coefficient (r) for the whole Eastern European region is 0.21, while a weaker 
relationship is noticed for EECs which are EU members (r=0.13) and represents only around 
half of the correlation coefficient of non-EU members (r=0.28). These facts suggest that fiscal 
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decentralization indeed plays some role in accelerating economic performance, albeit a 
relatively small one. Similarly, Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer (2009) conclude that, while 
expenditure at and transfers to the subnational level have had a negative impact on economic 
performance in Central and Eastern Europe, locally imposed taxation has achieved some 
mildly positive economic benefits over time. In addition, many studies indicate that the 
success of decentralization processes is a consequence of not only the design of the 
decentralization model but, perhaps more importantly, of country characteristics and 
especially of the existence of strong effective institutions at all government tiers (Dabla-
Norris, 2006). Indeed, Buser (2011) empirically confirms that the growth-enhancing effects of 
decentralization are much greater when supported by a sound institutional environment. This 
could be one explanation of why fiscal decentralization seems to have less success in 
emerging market economies of the Eastern Europe region. Nevertheless, as the presented 
simple figures (Fig. 4) do not control for other confounding determinants and can therefore 
only provide some preliminary evidence, further empirical work should provide more robust 
tests of the relationship between the variables. 
  
4.2. Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of the Public Sector 
Whether fiscal decentralization leads to a reduction or an increase in the size of the public 
sector is a well researched question within the field of fiscal federalism. Most of the empirical 
work on decentralization and government size attempts to test Brennan and Buchanan’s 
Leviathan hypothesis (see Feld et al. 2003, for an exhaustive literature review). The previous 
empirical results are quite inconclusive. On one hand, Oates (1972), Edhaie (1994), Rodden 
(2003), and Ashworth et al. (2008) find that decentralization generally has a negative impact 
on the growth of governments. On the other hand, Stein (1999), Heil (1991), Stein (1998), Jin 
and Zou (2002), and Cassette and Paty (2010) conclude that fiscal decentralization leads to an 
expansion of the public sector. Nevertheless, many of these studies conclude that fiscal 
autonomy leads to smaller states while grants have a positive impact on public sector size.  
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Figure 5: Correlation between the FDI and public sector expenditures (in % of GDP) in 
selected EECs 
 
Note: The data are based on available data averages for the 2001–2010 period. 
Sources: IMF (GFS), 2012; own calculations 
 
Few empirical surveys have measured the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size of the 
public sector in EECs. For instance, Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) find that subnational tax 
autonomy has a negative and significant impact on public sector size in ten transition 
countries for the 1997–1999 period. In our analysis, as shown in Fig. 5, those EECs with a 
more fiscal decentralized arrangement generally experienced a larger public sector (with 
correlation coefficients (r) of 0.36) for the 1993–2010 period. However, there is a significant 
difference between EU and non-EU member states in the Eastern European region. While EU 
members exhibit a weak negative correlation (with r=-0.26) between fiscal decentralization 
and the size of government, non-EU members show a relatively stronger positive correlation 
(with r=0.63). Obviously, as suggested by Jin and Zou (2002), fiscal decentralization in non-
EU members, which is primarily funded from sources controlled by the centre, increases the 
size of subnational governments. Consequently, expansion of the public sector at the 
subnational level due to transfers from the centre also forces the national government to grow. 
Moreover, the analysis also reveals that fiscal autonomy in both subregions is more closely 
linked to public sector size than fiscal importance.
15
 Accordingly, the fiscal autonomy of 
subnational governments plays a relatively important role in determination of public sector 
                                                           
15
 Indeed, the correlation between FA and the public sector size in EU members of the region is -0.54 (in non-EU 
members r=0.67), while the correlation between FI and public sector size amounts to -0.16 in the EU members 
(in non-EU members r=0.53). 
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size in the region, albeit not in the same directions for both subregions. While fiscal autonomy 
reduces the public sector in the EU members, it causes public sector growth in the non-EU 
members of the Eastern European region (probably due to corruption, inadequate 
governmental decisions, rent-seeking, and other phenomena that accompany decentralization 
processes). However, these relationships need to be confirmed by further empirical research.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
Most Eastern European countries started the transition process by restructuring their political, 
economic and state systems as a reaction to the political and economic failure of the former 
authoritarian centralized systems. Since there is no optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, 
the level of decentralization has primarily been shaped by political, historical and ethnic 
realities, and its effectiveness has been influenced by the institutional design and capacities of 
the various levels of government. The need for decentralization and devolution of power from 
central to subnational authorities has become one of the priorities in changing the state in 
most of these countries to make it more democratic and efficient in delivering public services 
and promoting economic and social development. While fiscal decentralization has been a 
dominant feature of the reform process in the Central European, South-east European and 
Baltic states, this is not the case in many countries of Transcaucasia and some other former 
Soviet states. Authoritarian legacies of the past, the capture of power by certain elites or lack 
of political consensus on state reform has either prevented decentralization from appearing on 
the reform agenda or, when it is there, little has been done to ensure genuine progress towards 
implementation. However, in order to have sound and efficient fiscal decentralization, three 
main principles should be followed in EECs, i.e. the clarity of roles and transparency, an 
explicit and well-defined measure of autonomy, and developed institutional capacity.  
 
In this respect, the paper applies a recent methodology for measuring fiscal decentralization 
(developed by Vo (2009)) and examines the degree of fiscal decentralization in EECs over the 
last two decades. Conceptually, the measurement of fiscal decentralization was focused on the 
fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of subnational governments. The empirical results show 
that the highest level of (average) fiscal decentralization (centralization) among the non-EU members 
(in the Eastern European region) is found in Russia (Armenia) and among the EU members in Estonia 
(Slovak Republic) in the 1993–2010 period. Further, the empirical results show that, in general, 
the degree of fiscal decentralization is statistically higher in developed OECD countries than 
in most emerging market economies (i.e. EECs). However, in contrast to our expectations, 
18 
 
there has been a concerning downward trend of the fiscal decentralization index (FDI) in the 
majority of the region over the last two decades. Nevertheless, fiscal decentralization is only 
one dimension of decentralization, which may not lead to devolution and the empowerment of 
local citizens and institutions if not accompanied by administrative and, above all, political 
decentralization. Consequently, fiscal decentralization (including other dimensions of 
decentralization) remains an important task to ensure progress in the region in the near future.  
 
Moreover, the paper also examines the effects of fiscal decentralization on growth and public 
sector size in EECs. The analysis shows some evidence that increases in public sector 
decentralization are associated with higher income levels. However, the growth-enhancing 
effects of fiscal decentralization are expected to be much greater when supported by a sound 
institutional environment. Therefore, the EECs, in particular non-EU member states of the 
region, should improve their administrative and technical capability in order to establish 
sound and effective fiscal decentralization. Further, our results provide some evidence that 
fiscal decentralization in EECs generally might lead to an increase in the size of government, 
albeit there are significant differences between EU and non-EU member states. Fiscal 
autonomy, in particular, shows some evidence of having an important role in decreasing 
public sector size in the EU members of the Eastern European region. Nevertheless, further 
empirical work is needed to provide more robust tests of the relationship between the 
variables.     
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